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Abstract
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The authors use firm-level survey data from the 
manufacturing sector in 20 Sub-Saharan African 
countries to explore the links between labor market 
regulations and net job creation. A first look at firm 
characteristics, perceptions, and the dynamics of 
employment at the firm level suggests that labor 
regulations are not the main “binding constraint” on job 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department, Africa Region—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to analyze the relationships between labor market policy, economic growth, and poverty 
reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The authors may be contacted at lfox@worldbank.org, and aoviedo@worldbank.org. 
creation. Other issues seem more important at this level 
of development. The analysis estimates the determinants 
of net job creation incorporating the legal origin of the 
country as a proxy for regulation. The findings show that, 
after controlling for other firm-level characteristics, legal 
origin is uncorrelated with net job creation in the short 
run.  
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I. Introduction 
The last two decades have seen the emergence of a rich literature on the economic impact of 
generous employment protection legislation (EPL hereafter) in certain countries, motivated in 
part by the widening gap in employment between continental European countries and the 
United States during the 1990s, and by subsequent regulatory reforms in Europe and Latin 
America to boost job creation and reduce unemployment. There are very few empirical studies 
on the impact of EPL in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA hereafter), despite the importance of job 
creation for poverty reduction in Africa. 
EPL is usually enacted with the goal of preventing unfair or discriminatory treatment and 
providing protection for workers who either lose their jobs or are temporarily unable to work. 
Empirical evidence suggests that a side effect of some EPL provisions is to reduce labor demand 
overall, which translates into a reduction in wage and salary employment, especially for particular 
groups.  
We exploit the firm level data provided by the Enterprise Surveys conducted in SSA between 
2003 and 2007 to investigate how labor market outcomes, in particular net job creation, relate to 
country labor regulations. Ideally, we would like to analyze gross job flows, that is, the sum of job 
creation and job destruction, rather than net flows. Unfortunately these data are not available in 
the surveys, so we use net flows as an indicator, albeit imperfect, of labor adjustment. Therefore, 
our results should not be interpreted as definitive evidence of a relation – or lack thereof- 
between employment creation, labor adjustment and regulation, but rather as a first indication of 
the importance of regulation, relative to other factors that matter to African firms.  
We find that employment growth is strongly associated – as in other regions- with firm size, age, 
and other indicators of productivity, such as investment in human capital, technology use, etc. 
Employment growth is not associated with measures of labor regulation, and firms’ perceptions 
indicate that regulation is a minor obstacle, when compared to the lack of infrastructure, limited 
access to credit, and others. In addition, a structural change that occurred in certain SSA 
countries between 2003 and 2006 seems to have encouraged firm expansion, irrespective of the 
regulatory environment. Multivariate analysis of firm recall data show that over the last three 
years, regulation is not associated with employment growth at the firm level. But our analysis 
also reveals a significant relationship between regulation – as measured by the labor and overall 
regulation indicators from Doing Business - and long-run employment growth at the firm level. 
Thus, the hypothesis that regulation does not matter or will not matter in the future for SSA 
employment growth cannot be firmly rejected. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes the current literature on the 
effects of labor regulation on various labor market outcomes in other regions and in SSA, 
including the methodological problems with isolating this effect. Section III describes the data. 
Section IV provides a bivariate analysis of firms’ characteristics, their perceptions, the regulatory 
environment and employment expansion. Section V provides a multivariate econometric 
estimation of the impact of legal origin on job creation. Section VI concludes. 
II. Employment protection legislation and labor market outcomes 
A large number of cross-country studies document the effects of EPL on labor market 
outcomes. The bulk of the work has focused on OECD countries, and on the costs of severance 
pay, mainly in order to shed light on the persistent differences in unemployment between 
continental Europe and the United States since the 1970s.  In general, the argument is that if L. Fox and A.M. Oviedo    Institutions and Labor Market Outcomes in Africa 
firms face high severance costs, they are less inclined to hire workers, especially marginal 
workers such as unskilled workers, young workers, and women. This may eventually lead to 
lower overall employment (and in developing countries it can also lower employment in the 
formal sector, while increasing employment in the informal sector). To cite a few studies, Lazear 
(1990) finds that in the OECD, stringent EPL is associated with lower employment and labor 
participation rates. Similarly, the 1994 OECD Jobs Study concluded that reform in job security 
provision was necessary to expand employment in the private sector. However, there is some 
disagreement, for instance, Blank (1994) argues that the supposed trade-off between social 
protection and economic performance is far from obvious. For example, in some cases EPL 
leads to lower wages, but not lower overall employment. More generally, most analyses of EPL 
and other regulations look only at particular outcomes, but not at overall welfare. 
Studies of the impact of EPL on certain labor market outcomes in less developed economies by-
and-large confirm the evidence from advanced economies. For instance, Heckman and Pagés 
(2000) construct an index of job security legislation in Latin America, and look at how it is 
related to the level of employment using cross-section data. They find that higher job security is 
associated with lower levels of employment across Latin American countries.
1 Using Chilean 
data, Montenegro and Pagés (2003) find that EPL both reduces overall employment levels and 
changes the composition of the workforce by reducing the share of female and young workers. 
In a cross-section analysis of countries over 80 countries, Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) compare 
firms’ perceptions about the stringency of labor market regulations with actual legislation.
2 They 
find that both match closely; in addition they find that firms that are relatively more exposed to 
EPL also rely more heavily on temporary contracts and on-the-job training.
3 
It has been assumed that in SSA the effect of EPL on employment in the private sector is similar 
to that in other countries (see, for example, Botero et al., 2004). But Africa specific studies of the 
effect of EPL on labor market outcomes have not been done – the evidence for SSA comes 
from cross-country analysis. Available evidence suggest that the effect of EPL on employment 
in the low income countries of SSA may be of a lesser magnitude than in Latin America or the 
OECD, at least at this point in their economic development. For instance, in their 
comprehensive discussion on the reasons for Africa’s sluggish job creation performance, Fox 
and Gaal (2008) point out that, despite the lack of studies of EPL similar to those done for 
OECD countries, available evidence based on firm perceptions emphasizes skill shortages as one 
of the main constraints to job creation, as well as overall low investment in labor–intensive 
manufacturing.
4 Firms report that the generally poor investment climate raises operating costs 
for businesses, making SSA less competitive when compared to other emerging economies. 
Evidence of skill shortages is found in studies of wage determination in Africa, as well as 
evidence that in SSA wage determination is not competitive. Fox and Oviedo (2008), Alby 
(2007), and others have found evidence of rent-sharing between firms and unions, as well as 
with older workers. Despite the potential selection bias (if union members or older workers are 
more productive), in their production function estimation Fox and Oviedo do not find that 
                                                 
1 This is particularly true for countries that have civil law systems. 
2 Since the 1990s, the World Bank has collected firm-level data in a large number of countries. The Enterprise 
Surveys contain detailed questions on the firm’s production and sales, but their main objective is to measure how 
the investment climate of the country affects the firm’s operations and decision-making process. These surveys have 
been extensively used to study a number of issues over the years (see for instance, WDR 2005). However, few of 
these have looked specifically at labor market institutions. 
3 Unfortunately, the number of African countries in their sample is rather small (around 2-3). 
4 See also Figure 2 below. 
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these groups of workers are significantly more productive than others, which supports the rent-
sharing hypothesis.
5 
Another approach to analyzing the effects of EPL is to study these regulations within the 
context of the historical background of the country’s private sector regulatory system. As La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Botero et al. (2004) note, through conquest and colonization European 
powers imposed on countries around the world legal systems adapted from two very distinct 
legal traditions coming from Western Europe, namely common and civil law.  
Common law, which originated in England “is characterized by the importance of decision-
making by juries, independent judges, and the emphasis on judicial discretion as opposed to 
codes” (Botero et al., 2004). Common law is the legal structure that predominates in Anglophone 
SSA countries. Civil law originated from Roman law and was adopted by civil codes in France 
and Germany. It is “characterized by less independent judiciaries, the relative unimportance of 
juries, and a greater role of both substantive and procedural codes as opposed to judicial 
discretion” (Botero et al., 2004). Civil law was adopted by Francophone and Lusophone SSA 
countries.
6  
Because of the inherent differences between both legal structures, it is natural to find differences 
between regulatory environments, which themselves must fit within their own legal system. 
Naturally, the literature finds a strong correlation between the stringency of regulations and the 
legal origin of the country. This is an important empirical fact, because although the introduction 
of new regulations is likely endogenous to the current economic and political situation of the 
country, the legal system itself was imposed at the time of colonization, and therefore it can be 
considered exogenous. The correlation between legal origin and regulation then allows the 
researcher to use legal origin as an instrument of regulation. Botero et al. (2004) take this 
approach and use data from 85 countries to analyze the determinants of EPL, and the impact of 
EPL on labor market outcomes. They find that more stringent EPL is associated with the civil 
law tradition, and that countries with more stringent regulation have lower labor force 
participation, and higher unemployment, especially youth unemployment.  
The main difficulty when comparing the effects of EPL in a cross-country context is that there 
is a potential endogeneity problem, hence, a positive correlation between EPL and the measured 
outcome cannot be taken as evidence of a causal relationship. For example, Fox and Gaal (2008) 
note that although few firms in Africa cite EPL as a main obstacle to business in enterprise 
surveys, EPL might well be correlated to factors outside the labor market, such as weak 
infrastructure, and poor governance (which are perceived as severe obstacles). In such a case, 
cross-country OLS analysis (such as that in Heckman and Pagés, 2000, which uses one fixed 
effect variable to control for all unobservable country effects) is unable to disentangle the effects 
coming from EPL from those of other country-specific policies.
7 In addition, EPL may create 
disincentives for investment in certain sub-sectors or technologies that require high labor 
                                                 
5 Note that EPL may be amplifying skill shortages, thus reducing investment and job creation. Analysis of the legal 
restrictions to hiring foreign workers in the countries from our sample reveals that the number of countries with 
special restrictions (usually requiring replacing foreign with native workers after some time) is high, and greater in 
the Francophone group. This can exacerbate skill shortages for firms. 
6 With apologies to the Portuguese, for simplicity, hereafter we refer to common law countries as “Anglophone” 
and to civil law countries as “Francophone.” 
7 Freeman (2007), among others complains about this type of analysis, and overall, the limitations of the technique 
of cross country regression analysis have been widely vetted in the discussion of growth analytics. Note that in their 
paper, Heckman and Pagés try to correct for this in subsequent estimations but the issues remain. 
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turnover (i.e., labor market flexibility) to be efficient and competitive, and this cannot be 
detected by traditional cross-country analysis.
8     
Recent micro-based empirical work that estimates the effects of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) on labor market outcomes usually takes one of three methodological 
approaches to deal with endogeneity concerns. The first is to do a “quasi-experimental” analysis 
that estimates the effects of EPL by comparing labor market outcomes before and after EPL 
reforms that affected only a selected group of workers in one country.
9 These episodes 
constitute “natural experiments” that allow researchers to isolate more accurately the effects of 
EPL from other, unobserved variables, that might be correlated with EPL. For instance, Kugler 
(1999) finds that reducing firing costs in Colombia in the early 1990s increased labor mobility by 
facilitating entry into unemployment; at the same time, it encouraged formal employment, thus 
having an overall negative effect on unemployment in a period of economic expansion, whereas 
unemployment increased faster during the subsequent recession than it did before the reform. 
Saavedra and Torero (2000) examine the effects of EPL reforms in Peru during the 1990s, and 
find that reductions in the severance payments’ structure reduced the effect of labor costs on 
labor demand and led to faster adjustments of the labor demand. In addition, the average job 
tenure fell. Depending on how quickly workers were able to find jobs, this result could 
potentially be a negative labor market outcome from the point of view of household welfare.  
The second approach consists in comparing outcomes across different regions within a country, 
exploiting intra-country differences in legislation, or enforcement. For example, in a study of 
Indian manufacturing, Besley and Burgess (2004) find that in states with a more pro-worker EPL 
firms have lower average productivity, output, employment, and investment; the share of 
informal firms is larger, and urban poverty rates are higher. Ahsan and Pagés (2007) extend 
Besley and Burgess’ analysis to distinguish which types of EPL have the largest impact on labor 
market outcomes. They conclude that regulations pertaining to dispute resolution have a 
relatively stronger effect than other types of EPL.  
In countries with strict formal employment regulations (translated into high costs of hiring and 
firing workers), hiring workers informally might be a way for formal firms to adjust their 
employment level cheaply according to the business cycle (similarly for workers, self-
employment is always preferable to unemployment in the absence of unemployment benefits). 
Thus, preventing firms from using this “illegal” adjustment margin might indeed reduce informal 
employment, but at the expense of firm performance, if formal employment is kept highly 
protected. Almeida and Carneiro (2006) test this by exploiting differences in enforcement across 
cities in Brazil, and find that labor inspections significantly reduce employment, output, sales, 
capital stock, and job creation (measured in new hires).  
Another alternative is to look at how gross job flows (i.e., the sum of job creation and job 
destruction) behave across sectors in countries with different EPLs. The idea is that “natural” 
differences across sectors (for instance, technological differences) result in different labor 
adjustment patterns, making some industries more volatile than others in terms of job flows, 
regardless of the stringency of EPL. Thus, these “natural” differences can be affected in the 
presence of distortions (for instance EPL). Looking at the differences rather than the levels is a 
                                                 
8 This could include firms whose final product’s demand varies unpredictably (e.g. garments), or who suffer effects 
of seasonality and need to be able to lay off workers flexibly. 
9 See, for instance, Autor et al. (2007), Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004), Kugler and Pica (2008), Kugler et al. (2003). 
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way of controlling for unobservables that can lead to biased estimates when looking at levels. 
Studies such as Haltiwanger et al. (2006), and Micco and Pagés (2007) adapt the original 
methodology from Rajan and Zingales (1998), by taking the United States as the reference 
country (i.e. the country with the least stringent EPL), and comparing how differences in job 
flows across industries vary between the US and other countries. These studies find that in more 
regulated countries job turnover is lower in sectors where employment is intrinsically more 
volatile, thus reducing the “natural” turnover differences between sectors.  
Ideally, we would like to take one of these approaches in our analysis of SSA.  We are not able to 
do so for the following reasons: 
-  Most labor market reforms in SSA (such as those praised in recent Doing Business reports) 
have not been captured by DB scores, since most of these scores were computed after 
reforms took place (most scores are available only from 2007 onwards). Moreover, 
enterprise survey data is only available for one country-year in most cases. Current 
surveys are planned to allow for panel data, so that in the future this type of “quasi-
experimental” analysis will be feasible. 
-  Certain labor market outcomes studied in OECD and Latin American countries are not 
easily measured in SSA using standard definitions (e.g. unemployment). Instead, labor 
markets in SSA display much larger levels of informality (either at the firm, or at the 
worker level). In order to measure the different “stages of employment” at the firm and 
worker level, carefully conducted labor force survey data are required. These data are 
only now becoming available.  
-  Countries generally do not have province-level labor laws, as they do in India. Nor do we 
have data on the extent of enforcement. In addition, in most small, low-income SSA 
countries, the overwhelming majority of private formal sector jobs are concentrated in 
one or two main cities.  
-  In our firm-level data, we only observe net job creation (employment growth), which is a 
very imperfect indicator of labor dynamics. A firm can very well exhibit no net job 
creation and have large gross flows, yet, concluding that the firm is not adjusting because 
net job creation is low would be incorrect. 
What follows is a compilation of the evidence we can gather on the effects of EPL from the 
firm level data currently available for SSA. Following the argument of La Porta et al. (1998) and 
Botero et al. (2004) that the legal origin of the country is associated with the quality of its 
institutions, including the amount of regulation, we divide our sample into two groups, one with 
countries with a common law legal system (all of them British ex-colonies), and the other with 
countries with a civil law system (all ex-French colonies, except Cape Verde, which is a former 
Portuguese colony).   
Our main variable measuring labor regulation comes from the Doing Business indicators. (DB 
hereafter). A valid criticism of these indicators is that the most commonly used measures of 
labor regulation generally consider all regulations to be detrimental to economic performance. 
Hence, these measures deliberately ignore the potential costs (for instance the negative 
externalities) of having fully de-regulated markets. In the case of EPL, they also ignore the 
power difference between employees and employers which in the past, when EPL did not exist, 
produced highly negative economic and social consequences (e.g. Europe in the 19
th century). In 
its critical assessment of the DB indicators, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
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(World Bank, 2008(b)) concluded that “DB measures the costs but not the benefits of 
regulation.” In particular, the report notes that seven out of DB’s ten indicators systematically 
reward de-regulation, regardless of the country’s initial regulatory environment, and reform is 
understood as reducing regulations, rather than increasing their potential benefits.  
In our study, we cannot address these limitations; we use the DB indicators as we have no other 
comprehensive data sources. We use employment in manufacturing firms as our outcome 
variable. We cannot address the question of overall welfare of all employees and who are the 
winners and losers from this regulation in SSA.  
III. Data 
We use surveys of manufacturing firms carried out by the world-wide Enterprise Survey project 
of the World Bank group between 2003 and 2007.
10 The firms surveyed are for the most part 
registered for tax purposes; they employ at least 5 employees.
11 The manager/owner of the firm 
is interviewed in detail about basic firm characteristics (age, legal status, etc.), as well as specific 
investment climate questions, for instance whether the firm has experienced power outages, 
what the delays have been when it requested a public service, how difficult it is to deal with 
public officers, etc. In addition, the manager is asked to rank the investment climate obstacles 
according to his/her opinion (infrastructure, access to finance, labor regulations, crime, 
corruption, etc., a total of 15 investment climate aspects). In short, the surveys contain a rich set 
of questions that can be used to relate firm performance to the investment climate of the 
country.  
Within manufacturing, our sample has firms in the following sectors: food & beverages; 
chemicals, paints & pharmaceuticals; construction materials; metals; paper & printing; plastics; 
textiles, garments & leather; wood; and other manufacturing. 
Our sample covers 12 civil law countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Democratic Rep. Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Senegal), and 8 
common law countries: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, and 
Uganda.  
In the next section we explore the links between the stringency of regulations, in particular labor 
regulations, the perceptions of firms regarding regulations, and labor dynamics in manufacturing 
in SSA. 
IV. Institutions and manufacturing performance in Africa  
Most of the countries surveyed were experiencing a period of broad-based growth at the time of 
the survey, in many cases following a period of slower growth in the 1990s. An exception is 
Kenya, which in 2003 was just beginning to emerge from a period of very slow growth, caused 
in part by political uncertainty and stalemate. Manufacturing was growing as well, although it still 
accounts for less than 10 percent of overall value added in Sub-Saharan Africa.
12 Table 1 shows 
                                                 
10 Comprehensive information about these surveys is available at www.enterprisesurveys.org.  
11 In some countries, separate surveys have been implemented for micro- and informal firms, but we are not using 
these data at present. 
12 We exclude South Africa from our analysis. 
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that the share of manufacturing in GDP between 2002 and 2006 in 17 countries does not exceed 
14 percent (an exception is Swaziland, where it reaches 37 percent). At a first glance, the growth 
rate of manufacturing appears to have been higher than GDP growth in most countries over the 
period 2002-2006 (see Table 2); however, the average growth of manufacturing for the entire 
region is somewhat lower than GDP growth (weighting countries by their corresponding GDP). 
Figure 1 depicts the aggregate growth of GDP and manufacturing, showing that they have been 
similar over the period. 
 
Figure 1 














2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP Manufacturing
Note: GDP and manufacturing value added growth rates are aggregated using a weighted average, where each 
country is weighted by its total GDP in constant 2000 US Dollars.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using WDI (2007) data. 
 
In terms of employment, manufacturing is also a very small sector, accounting for less than 10 
percent of total employment on average.
13 For example, between 1998 and 2003 total wage and 
salary employment grew at 6 percent per year in Burkina Faso, however, its share in total 
employment went from 2.9 percent to 3.7 percent only.
14  
INSERT TABLES 1-3 
The good news for SSA is that growth in the manufacturing sector is bringing jobs. Despite 
having different economic conditions, in all countries (except Kenya) that were surveyed since 
2003, more that 50 percent of firms survey reported a larger number of employees than they had 
three years ago, and most reported double-digit growth in employment (Table 3). Data from two 
countries suggest that this employment growth is a very recent trend - both Ugandan and 
Tanzanian firms show most of their expansion since 2003, and Senegal, also surveyed in 2003, 
                                                 
13 For example, the share of industry employment in total employment is about 7 percent in Madagascar and 
Uganda (World Bank, 2007).  
14 See Fox and Gaal (2008). 
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shows a lower percent of firms growing.
15 This may represent some type of structural shift, 
possibly related to regulation. According to the Doing Business report of 2006, Africa was a top 
reformer, owing to the number of regulatory reforms introduced. As is common throughout the 
world, small and young firms are growing much faster than large firms, but even large firms are 
expanding at over 10 percent on average (Table 4).
16 There seems to be no difference in 
employment growth between exporters and non-exporters, and firms in Francophone countries 
are growing slightly faster than in Anglophone. 
INSERT TABLES 4-5  
Where does SSA stand in terms of regulation? According to the Doing Business (DB) indicators, 
not very well (even after introducing major reforms earlier in the decade). An overview of the 
DB scores is presented in Table 5 for Anglophone and Francophone countries.  This reveals 
that overall regulation and labor regulation is more stringent in Francophone countries, although 
both groups have quite poor scores (high scores) when compared to the rest of the world.
17 In 
virtually all categories (entry, licensing, registration, labor, contracts, trade, taxation, access to 
finance, investor protection, bankruptcy), the Anglophone group’s rank stands ahead of the 
Francophone group’s. For instance, in the labor regulation category, the Anglophone group has 
better scores in hiring, rigidity of hours, and has lower non-wage labor costs. Furthermore, even 
though the actual firing costs (in terms of weeks of wages) are higher in Anglophone countries 
the overall firing index is lower (that is, firing is less difficult legally).
18  
INSERT TABLES 5-6 
At a first glance, the stringent EPL and overall high level of business regulations in SSA 
countries do not seem to be stifling employment growth. Table 6 shows the average 
employment growth by country together with two DB indicators: labor market regulation and 
the overall regulation ranking. Countries are sorted according to the overall ranking, from best to 
worst. As we can easily note, there seems to be no pattern between employment growth and the 
regulation ranking of the country.  
Firms agree that EPL is not an important obstacle to growth. The surveys measure firms’ 
perceptions of the business environment (Figure 2). Although there is a potential endogeneity 
problem (i.e., these firms are the survivors of the regulatory environment), what firms report 
hinders them the most is not the regulatory environment, but limitations in infrastructure, access 
and cost of finance, and government behavior (corruption).
19 Labor regulations rank lowest 
relative to all other constraints according to firms.
20 Even more important, the ranking of 
                                                 
15 There may also have been a difference in the sampling strategies in the two years.  Although the sampling 
strategies are supposed to be the same, in Uganda, we find important differences in the distribution of firms by 
sector in the two samples. 
16 Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier (2008) analyze employment growth in a large cross section of countries around 
the world. 
17 The DB score shows the ordinal ranking of the country relative to all other countries where DB data are collected 
and analyzed. As they are ordinal scores, a country could undertake a major reform, yet not see much change it its 
DB score because other countries with similar scores are also reforming. This may be happening in Africa. 
18 For methodological details, see www.doingbusiness.org.  
19 Note that some dimensions of Doing Business, such as poor contract enforcement, show up to the entrepreneur as 
an increased risk, and hence the lender may raise the cost of finance. 
20 This is also found in South Africa by Habyarimana (2008). 
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obstacles tends to be the same across both Francophone and Anglophone countries, although 
there are a few differences in the perception of the severity.
21  
 
Figure  2 

















Labor regulations are an obstacle
(% firms)
Lack of skills is an obstacle
(% firms)
Access to finance is an obstacle
(% firms)
Cost of finance is an obstacle
(% firms)
Infrastructure is an obstacle
(% firms)
Corruption is an obstacle (% firms)




Anglophone Francophone Source: Enterprise Surveys
 
Another indicator of the limited impact of the differing institutional environments is that there 
are few differences in the characteristics of manufacturing firms between Francophone and 
Anglophone countries. Tables 7 and 8 show industry composition, and other basic firm 
characteristics in our sample. The industry composition is very similar between the two groups, 
with over a quarter of firms belonging to the food processing sector, and the rest roughly 
divided across the textile & garments, furniture, and basic metals industries. Perhaps, not 
surprisingly, these industries correspond to medium-low and low-technology sectors in the 
“OECD-sense.” About one-quarter of firms in both groups export (at least) some of their 
output. 
                                                 
21 The endogeneity problem creates a double sample selection bias. The first is related to the firms that are not 
observed because they do not exist, (either because they never entered the market (entry barriers too high) or 
because they already exited (operating costs too high). The second is related to the existence of a large informal 
sector, which although observable, is not captured in these surveys. Firms typically choose to be informal either 
because formalization is too complex, or because their low scale and productivity makes them competitive only if 
they can avoid taxation. In any event, recent research shows that formalization in Africa is strongly related to access 
to finance, taxation, and access to infrastructure (see Ingram et al., 2007) 
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INSERT TABLES 7 & 8 
Despite the similar industry composition across groups, we do find a few differences in other 
firm characteristics: 24 percent of firms in the Francophone area are partly (or entirely) foreign 
owned, which is the case only for 13 percent in the Anglophone area. Thus, despite an 
apparently weaker investment climate, Francophone countries attract more foreign investment. 
In addition, 33 percent of firms in Anglophone countries provide training to their workers, 
which is slightly higher than in Francophone countries (29 percent). This potentially contradicts 
Pierre and Scarpetta’s finding that firms in more regulated environments tend to provide more 
training, since layoffs are more costly. Another interesting finding in our sample is the 
percentage of workers that firms “usually” report to the authorities: on average in Francophone 
countries firms report 67 percent of their workforce, whereas in Anglophone countries firms 
report only 49 percent. This indicates that informal behavior is more prevalent in Anglophone countries, 
which again contradicts the idea that firms are reacting to more stringent regulations.
22 
INSERT TABLES 9 & 10 
Rates of unionization are not unusually high, especially in the Francophone group, which also 
seems at odds with the picture of labor market rigidity from Doing Business, above. In general we 
find that rates of unionization are not unusually high, especially in the Francophone group, 
which also seems at odds with the picture of labor market rigidity from Doing Business, above. 
However, several studies of the African labor market point out that unions have by-and-large 
lost ground since the 1980s.
23 Overall, less than half of firms in Anglophone countries have any 
union presence at all, while only a quarter of Francophone firms have union presence. Table 12 
shows that older firms have a more unionized labor force.
24  
Among all the evidence on the irrelevance of EPL in Africa for employment growth, the survey 
data provide one piece of evidence that employment could be even higher without such strict 
EPL. In Table 7 we analyze firms’ responses to the following question “in the absence of 
restrictions to hiring and firing workers, how many workers would you currently employ? 
(Answer expressed as a percentage of current employment)” The first column takes the average 









=− ∑  
This number reflects labor demand at the firm, and deviations between actual and potential 
employment could in principle stem from frictions in the labor market caused by regulation. 
However, it is possible that this measure reflect changes in employment under “static” 
conditions, that is, firms only consider a scenario without restrictions to hiring and firing, 
without taking into account potential changes in wages that would occur if many firms decided 
                                                 
22 We have no measure of effectiveness of compliance measures.  It maybe Anglophone firms use informality more 
because the chances of getting caught are higher compared with the chances for Francophone firms, even though 
the cost of the  regulation on the firm maybe  higher in Francophone.  
23 See Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2002), Fox and Gaal (2008). However, this does not imply that union members 
receive equal treatment as compared to non-members. See also Freeman (2007). 
24 Fox and Oviedo (2008) also find that unionization increases with worker age and tenure, which may be one of the 
reasons for the high severance pay costs in Anglophone countries. 
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to increase their labor demand (or to lay off many workers) simultaneously, as well as an 
complementary capital needed (working or for investment) to keep all these workers busy.  
In any event, this measure suggests that the observed dynamics of employment in these firms 
hide a potentially even more dynamic sector. Table 11 shows that there is a large variance in D  
across countries, as it ranges from 0.1 percent of employment in Rwanda to over 100 percent in 
Kenya. More Francophone firms report they would have a larger workforce than Anglophone, 
and the average D  of 13.4 is also higher than the Anglophone average, equal to 10.3. Yet the 
Anglophone firms average desired  increase in employment is much higher than the average 
Francophone one. For those firms who, on the other hand, would like to reduce their 
workforce, the numbers are much smaller: on average these firms in Anglophone countries 
would reduce their employment by 3.2 percent, and in Francophone countries they would 
reduce employment by 6.1 percent.   
INSERT TABLE2 11-12 
Comparing firms’ responses between the 2003 and 2006 waves for Tanzania and Uganda, it 
seems that between these two years there has been a dramatic change in obstacles to labor 
adjustment. Indeed, in 2003 firms reported large deviations between potential and current 
employment, but this difference almost disappears by 2006; simultaneously, we observe a 
dramatic increase in employment growth, as shown in Table 3. 
Quantifying the association observed across countries in our survey data between regulation, and 
EPL in particular, and employment growth in SSA firms, Table 12 shows correlation coefficients 
between the DB overall and labor rankings and different measures of actual and potential 
employment growth.
25 Note that a countries’ DB labor and overall DB score is not well 
correlated, indicating that the correlation that Botero et al. (2004) observe between sub-catgories 
of the regulatory regime does not apply as strongly for EPL in Africa than in other areas.
26 But 
as weak as this association is, it is the only significant one in the table. All the rest are not very 
high, nor statistically significant. As noted before, net job creation is not a good indicator of total 
labor adjustment, which could be well correlated with regulation even if net job creation is not. 
However, we also find little correlation between potential labor adjustment D  and regulation, 
measured either with the DB indicator, or with firms’ perceptions.  
In summary, a preliminary inspection of the relationship between employment creation and 
labor regulation at the firm level reveals several intriguing facts: (1) employment growth is high 
across our entire sample in spite of a very “hostile” regulatory environment, as measured by the 
DB scores; (2) employment growth is no different between the “better” and the “worst” 
regulated countries (measured by DB); (3) there is little difference between countries industrial 
structure which could be related to labor regulation; (4) labor regulation does not appear to be a 
concern to firm managers; (5) in the absence of restrictions, firms would expand, rather than 
contract their workforce; and (6) there seems to be a structural change (at least in two countries) 
between 2003 and 2006 that allowed firms to expand employment.  
                                                 
25 We are grateful to John Haltiwanger for suggesting that we use correlation matrices to summarize these trends. 
26Another reason for the low correlation is that the EPL DB indicator is quite narrow, relative the range of EPL 
instruments. It does not, for example, cover the costs of dispute resolution, which Ahsan and Pagés (2007) have 
shown is one of the most important aspects of DPL for firms. See Fox and Gaal, (2008) for a critique of this 
indicator as it applies to Africa.  
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Would a multi-variate approach be more effective at isolating the effects of EPL on employment 
growth?  Possibly, if the methodological issues of causality could be overcome. As noted above, 
we do not have the data required for this in our sample. However, we do have two outcome 
variables observed at the firm level – employment growth over the last 3 years, and employment 
growth since the firm began as well as a large number of other firm-specific variables. In the 
following section we use these variables to explore more thoroughly whether there is an 
association, using a multivariate approach. 
V. Econometric analysis 
Following La Porta et al. (1998) and Botero et al. (2004) we examine the link between regulation 
and employment growth using a reduced form. We try two specifications. First we take legal 
origin as a proxy for regulation. However, because of the somewhat weak correlation between 
the extent of overall regulation and EPL in SSA, we estimate a second specification, which 
incorporates overall regulation and EPL separately.   
 We estimate the following equation: 
i i i i i OTHER LEGAL AGE SIZE EG ε α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  (1) 
where SIZE is the initial size of the firm, divided into 6 employment categories (5 or less, 6 to 
10, 11 to 20, 21 to 50, 51 to 100, and over 100); AGE is one of 5 age categories (less than 5, 5 to 
9, 10 to 19, 20 to 39, and 40 and older); LEGAL is the institutional variable, either (a) a dummy 
that equals one if the country has a civil law system, and zero otherwise or (b) is the country’s 
DB scores; and OTHER represent other firm characteristics, namely exporter status, access to 
credit, technology use, capital stock, ownership status, and human capital.  In addition to we 
include country and industry effects in all regressions, to minimize the potential for omitted 
variable bias. We also compute heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Finally, following Fox 
and Oviedo (2008) we estimate (1) by weighted least squares, where each country is weighted by 
its GDP measured in constant 2000 US Dollars. 
The dependent variable EG is measured as either annual average employment growth over the 
last three years, but alternatively we also use long-term growth, measured as the average annual 
growth rate from start-up to current size. In both cases, we have a truncation problem. Because 
this variable is based on recollection, we do not have in the regression firms which died in the 
last three years. Obviously, the longer the recall period used to measure employment growth, the 
worse the truncation problem. Thus for the long-run employment growth variable, the 
truncation problem may be severe. For example, if employment is more volatile in Anglophone 
countries than Francophone (there is more rapid expansion but also many more deaths),  we 
would see observe a higher expansion in Anglophone countries even though long run 
employment growth is actually higher in Francophone because there are fewer deaths. Thus 
these estimates should be regarded with care.  
Table 13 presents the results from four specifications, using legal origin as the institutional 
variable. The first two columns use annual employment growth as the dependent variable, and 
the last two columns use long term growth. In the first specification we only include firm size, 
age, and the legal origin dummy, whereas in the second specification we also include the other 
firm characteristics, in order to reduce potential multi-collinearity between legal origin and firm 
attributes. As Table 6 already indicated, our results confirm that smaller and younger firms grow 
faster, since all our size and age coefficients are negative and significant (the excluded categories 
are the smallest and youngest firms). However, there do not seem to be major differences in 
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growth rates across the different age and size classes, except between the excluded ones and the 
rest.
27 The legal system coefficient is not significant, and remains so when we include the other 
firm characteristics. Annual employment growth seems to be closely associated to ownership 
status, capital (measured by owning a power generator), and to a lesser extent, to exporter status 
and technology use (measured by the use of e-mail). The first result –sole proprietor’s firms 
grow faster- is likely associated with the fact that single-owner firms are also smaller, and 
younger. The other two results on the other hand, reflect the fact that more productive firms 
also grow faster, and they are more likely to be exporters and to use technology more intensively. 
INSERT TABLE 13 
When we use long-term growth as the dependent variable, results are quite different, and reveal 
further elements of employment dynamics in manufacturing. First, note that the differences in 
growth across size and age classes are much more marked for long term growth. Micro firms still 
grow faster, but there are also large differences in growth between small, medium, and large 
firms. For age, results are the opposite with older firms growing more, which is obvious given 
that older firms are likely to be more productive and hence to exhibit more sustained growth 
over long periods.  
In addition, the legal origin dummy has now a negative and significant coefficient, which may 
suggest that in civil law countries firms may tend to grow more slowly over long periods. 
However, its magnitude falls by half once we include other firm characteristics in the regression. 
In particular, we find that exporters, firms with more capital, firms that use technology more 
intensively, and firms that invest in human capital (measured by training provision), are likely to 
grow more over long periods. This is also true, albeit with a smaller effect, for firms with access 
to credit. Interestingly, the coefficient of ownership is now negative, suggesting that single-
owner firms might have higher short term growth, but in the long term those that survive, and 
grow more are multiple-owner firms. 
Altogether, the explanatory power of our specifications is quite low, ranging from 0.06 to 0.14, 
which indicates that there are many unobserved factors that influence employment growth, and 
that are not captured by our variables. In any case, the results from these simple regressions 
suggest that the regulatory environment is not a good predictor of the job creation performance 
of the manufacturing sector in the short run, although we do find that in the long run more 
regulated countries (in our case countries with a civil law tradition) tend to have firms that grow 
less over their lifetime.  
Our next exercise consists of estimating a similar equation to (1) but instead of using a single 
country dummy to capture all country-level variables that could affect net job creation, we use a 
set of country-level controls that include GDP growth (over the last year if the dependent 
variable is short term employment growth, and growth trend over 1996-2005 if the dependent 
variable is long run growth); and two DB measures, the overall regulation rank, and the labor 
regulation rank. Each rank is converted into a number that is between 0 and 1 (where 1 is the 











                                                 
27 Very old firms also grow at a rate significantly smaller than that of young firms. 
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We include the firm level controls used in the second specification of Table 13, as we know that 
they are significantly related to employment growth. We estimate three alternative specifications. 
The first only uses the overall DB score, the second only uses the labor DB score, and the last 
one uses both. We do not include the legal origin dummy in this exercise. As before, we estimate 
this equation using short term employment growth, and average growth over the firm’s lifetime.  
INSERT TABLE 14 
Table 14 shows the results of the estimations. Our results in general are not very different from 
those in Table 13, except for a few points. Our DB scores are not significant for short term 
employment growth when these scores stand alone (in columns 1 and 2 of Table 14). When we 
combine both DB scores we actually find that more overall regulation is (weakly) associated with 
less employment growth, while the opposite is true for labor regulation, which is puzzling.  
For long-run employment growth results seem stronger, and consistent with our findings 
presented in Table 13. We find that both overall DB and labor scores have negative and 
significant coefficients, however only the overall score remains significant when we include both 
in the regression. The coefficient of GDP growth trend over the period 1996-2005 is negative, 
which is confusing. It may suggest that in some countries GDP growth was driven by 
technological progress or increases in capital intensity (e.g. the growth of mining activities), 
which are not necessarily beneficial for job creation.  
In our econometric analysis we do not attempt to establish a causal relationship between 
regulation and employment growth. One explanation is that countries with more stringent 
regulation, and more generally countries with a civil law tradition, tend to have firms that grow 
less over their lifetime, even after controlling for firm characteristics and industry composition. 
But an alternative explanation could be that in civil law countries employment is less volatile (but 
not necessary lower). However, if this were the case, we would also expect firms in more 
regulated countries to grow more slowly in the short term, as they would have more difficulties 
to adjust their labor force, but we do not find this to be the case.   
One possible explanation for this is that DB indicators, as well as the legal origin, do not 
accurately capture some elements of regulation that are important for firms in the short run. As 
noted earlier, this is one of the main criticisms raised by the evaluation of DB indicators by the 
World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank, 2008(b)).
28 For example, Ahsan and 
Pagés (2007) find that in India (which has a common law system), specific laws pertaining to 
conflict resolution have a much larger impact on labor market outcomes than laws typically 
measured in the DB scores (severance pay, etc.). These laws would be left out of a DB-type 
index, and in a cross-country set up, legal origin alone would not be able to capture the 
heterogeneity of labor regulations. Finally, it is well established that regulation, governance, and 
the legal origin of a country are closely correlated, especially product market regulations (and to a 
lesser extent, labor and fiscal regulations).
29 Therefore, the significant relationship between the 
                                                 
28 The report notes that “DB is not intended to, and cannot, capture country nuances. Firms’ investment decisions 
also depend on variables not measured by the DB indicators, such as the cost and access to finance and 
infrastructure, labor skills, and corruption. Different aspects of regulation have varying degrees of economic 
importance depending on countries’ income levels, legal regimes, and other characteristics.” See World Bank 
(2008(b)). 
29 See for instance, Loayza et al. (2005). 
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DB indicator or the legal origin, and employment growth could in fact be capturing other 
institutional aspects of importance for employment growth that are not easily measured (such as 
enforcement).  
VI. Concluding remarks 
The recent evidence for many developed and emerging economies of the potentially harmful 
impact of labor and other regulations on economic outcomes (growth, employment, etc.) has 
triggered calls for regulation reform across the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), however, 
little is known about the actual impact of regulations, and given the severity of the many 
constraints to economic development in SSA, it is reasonable to think that labor and other 
regulations might not be among the top “binding constraints” to development. 
This paper seeks to analyze the effect of regulations –labor regulations, but more broadly, the 
legal system- on job creation. Our preliminary examination of firm-level data on employment 
growth and firm perceptions about the investment climate, contrasted with widely used Doing 
Business (DB) regulation indicators, suggests that (1) employment growth in manufacturing is 
high across SSA in spite of a very “hostile” regulatory environment; (2) employment growth is 
no different between the “better” and the “worse” regulated countries; (3) labor regulation does 
not appear to be a concern to firm managers; (4) in the absence of restrictions, firms would 
expand, rather than contract their workforce; and (5) there seems to have been a structural 
change between 2003 and 2006 that allowed firms to expand employment.  
We also find an ambiguous statistical relation between job creation (measured as short- and 
long-term employment growth), the DB regulation scores, and the origin of the country’s legal 
system (a proxy for regulation). In the short term, employment growth is neither related to any 
measure of regulation, nor to legal origin. Instead, it seems to be more driven by firm 
characteristics that determine productivity: having access to credit, investing in human capital, 
using technology, etc. In the long run, however, regulation and the legal origin seem to play a 
role, as they are significantly associated to employment growth over a firm’s lifetime, in addition 
to the firm characteristics mentioned above. Regarding the right policies to enhance job creation 
in SSA, our results seem to confirm that regulation reform alone might not lead to the high 
payoffs observed in other regions, and that improving the overall investment climate should 
instead be the focus.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 
      Year 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Botswana  4.2 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.7 
Gambia  5.7 5.3 5.3 5.2   
Ghana  9.0 9.0 8.8 8.3 7.6 
Kenya  11.3 11.2 11.2 11.5 12.1 
Namibia  11.1 12.4 13.5 13.1 12.9 
Swaziland 37.9  38.4 37.9 37.2 36.8 












Uganda 10.0  9.3 9.2 9.2 8.6 
Benin  8.6 8.5 7.6 7.5     
Burkina Faso  12.3  12.9       
Burundi  8.4 8.5 8.5 8.8   
Cameroon 20.6  20.2 19.2 18.7 18.5 
Cape Verde  6.1  8.0      4.8 
Congo, DR  5.4  5.4 6.3 6.6 6.5 
Guinea  4.1 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Madagascar 12.5  13.7 14.2 14.0 13.4 
Mali  3.2 2.8 3.4 3.2 3.1 
Mauritania  6.2 6.0 5.9 5.0   













Senegal 12.5  11.7 11.5 10.9 10.2 
Source: Africa Development Indicators (2007)     
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Table 2: Manufacturing, value added and GDP growth (% per year) 
         Year 
         2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
Botswana Manufacturing  1.6  1.9  4.2 2 1.2 
  GDP  5.6  6.2  6.2 4 2.1 
Gambia Manufacturing  4.5  4.7  4.7     
  GDP  -3.2 7 5.1 5 4.5 
Ghana  Manufacturing       
  GDP  4.5 5.2 5.6 5.9 6.2 
Kenya Manufacturing  0.1 6 4.5  4.7  6.9 
  GDP  0.5 2.9 5.1 5.7 6.1 
Namibia Manufacturing  9.6  5.2  3  2.1  -8.6 
  GDP  6.7 3.5 6.6 4.7 2.9 
Swaziland Manufacturing 2.1  2  1.8  1.7  2.4 
  GDP  2.9 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.1 
Tanzania Manufacturing  8 8.6  8.6 9 7.1 
  GDP  7.2 5.7 6.7 6.8 5.9 












    GDP  6.4 4.7 5.4 6.7 5.4 
Benin  Manufacturing  5.5  0.4  -2.1  4.5        
  GDP  4.5 3.9 3.1 2.9 4.1 
Burkina Faso  Manufacturing 22.1  4.5  10.5 5.8  2.9 
 GDP  4.7  8  4.6  7.1  6.4 
Burundi  Manufacturing       
 GDP  4.4  -1.2  4.8  0.9  5.1 
Cameroon Manufacturing 5.5  3.6  4  4  4.7 
  GDP  4  4 3.7 2 3.8 
Cape Verde  Manufacturing  10.7  7.6  12.2         
 GDP  4.6  6.2  -0.7  11.9  6.1 
DR Congo  Manufacturing  6.8  10.1 8.9  9.3  8 
  GDP  3.5 5.8 6.6 6.5 5.1 
Guinea Manufacturing  6  -4  3  1.5  5.2 
  GDP  4.2 1.2 2.7 3.3 2.8 
Madagascar Manufacturing -20.7 14.5 6.5  2.5  2.7 
 GDP  -12.7 9.8  5.3  4.6  4.9 
Mali Manufacturing  22.7  -5.5  20.9 1.1  0.9 
  GDP  4.2 7.4 2.2 6.1 5.3 
Mauritania Manufacturing -4.5  -1  10.4 -11.7  11.7 
 GDP  1.1  5.6  5.2  5.4  11.7 
Rwanda Manufacturing  5  -5  -4  11  13.5 
 GDP  9.4  0.9  4  6  5.3 













    GDP  0.7 6.7 5.9 5.6 2.3 
Source: WDI (2007)       
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Table 3: Employment growth 
     
Average employment 
growth rate at firm 
(percent) 
Firms with positive 
employment growth 
(percent) 
Botswana (2006)  20.3  61.6 
Gambia (2006)  27.4  76.5 
Ghana2007 17.5  60.1 
Kenya (2003)  2.9  40.0 
Namibia (2006)  31.7  72.9 
Swaziland (2006)  9.9  64.2 
Tanzania (2003)  2.2  25.6 
Tanzania (2006)  14.0  69.1 
Uganda (2003)  2.3  22.9 












Total 16.2  60.8 
Benin (2004)  17.4  48.3 
Burkina Faso (2006)  12.7  58.7 
Burundi (2006)  17.1  69.2 
Cameroon (2006)  5.0  51.7 
Cape Verde (2006)  14.1  42.6 
DR Congo (2006)  12.5  56.2 
Guinea (2006)  23.8  76.5 
Madagascar (2005)  24.4  60.9 
Mali (2003)  22.0  52.9 
Mauritania (2006)  18.7  66.9 
Rwanda (2006)  25.3  83.0 













Total 18.4  59.3 
Overall average  16.6    
Source: Enterprise Surveys     
 
 
21L. Fox and A.M. Oviedo    Institutions and Labor Market Outcomes in Africa 
 






By firm initial size 
Micro [1-5]  28.8 
Small [6-10]  11.4 
Small-medium [11-20]  11 
Medium [21-50]  12.3 
Medium-large [51-100]  -0.2 
Large [100+]  10.8 
By exporter status 
Non-exporter 16.6 
Exporter   16.3 
By firm age 
Less than 5 years old  35.2 
5 to 9 years old  25.0 
10 to 19 years old  17.8 
20 to 39 years old  4.4 
40 years old and older  -0.2 
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Table 6: Employment growth and regulation 
   DB overall  DB labor 
Employment 
growth 
Namibia (2006)  39.5  33.5  31.7 
Botswana (2006)  50  70  20.3 
Kenya (2003)  77  66  2.9 
Swaziland (2006)  93  51  9.9 
Ghana (2007)  109  131  17.5 
Uganda (2003)*  117  10.5  2.3 
Uganda (2006)*  117  10.5  21 
Gambia (2006)*  129  28.5  27.4 
Tanzania (2003)*  129.5  150.5  2.2 
Tanzania (2006)*  129.5  150.5  14 
Cape Verde (2006)  130  144  14.1 
Benin (2004)  149  116.5  17.4 
Rwanda (2006)  150  95  25.3 
Cameroon (2006)  154  121.5  5 
Madagascar (2005) 154.5  149.5  24.4 
Mauritania (2006)  158  120.5  18.7 
Mali (2003)  160  89  22 
Senegal (2003)  160  161.5  17 
Burkina Faso (2006)  163  151.5  12.7 
Guinea (2006)  166.5  99  23.8 
Burundi (2006)  174.5 109.5  17.1 
DR Congo (2006)  178  172.5  12.5 
Total 129.4  102.7  16.6 
Countries are ranked according to Doing Business overall rank (higher values 
indicate lower ranking). Shaded countries belong to Anglophone group. 
*: Average scores for available years. 
Source: Enterprise Surveys, Doing Business 
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Table 7: Industry distribution by country (number of firms) 


































































































































































































Botswana  (2006)  12  10  19  19 8  8  0 28 0 10  114 
Gambia  (2006)  5 0 2 8  11  1 1 4 0 1  33 
Ghana2007  80  7 0 0  21  0 6  128  0  71  313 
Kenya  (2003)  69 25 17  8  42 18 23 68 12  0 282 
Namibia  (2006)  18  4 9  22  16  10  2 7 0  18  106 
Swaziland  (2006)  15 5  8  4  2 10 2 21 0  3 70 
Tanzania  (2003)  81 27 11 65 29 25  7  31  0  0 276 
Tanzania  (2006)  70  15 9 60  27  16 6 56 0 14  273 
Uganda  (2003)  122  18 40 47 21 23  7  15  7  0 300 












Total  564 119 125 326 230 133  54  375  19  129  2,074 
Benin  (2004)  50  9  10 61 27 45  3  7  25 10  247 
Burkina  Faso  (2006)  14  1 1 0 3  12  2 4 7 7  51 
Burundi  (2006)  23  14 2 22 6  8  1 26 0  0  102 
Cameroon  (2006)  31  11 6  0  8 19 6  7 18  13  119 
Cape  Verde  (2006)  12  1 2 0 0 0 1 5  16  10  47 
DR  Congo  (2006)  59  16 3 24  10 4  2 22 0  9  149 
Guinea  (2006)  27 3  0 29  18 0  0 41 0 17  135 
Madagascar  (2005) 45  17 0 64  20 6 13  89 0 38  292 
Mali  (2003)  51 16 19 13 22 11  7  10  5  0 154 
Mauritania  (2006) 29  5 4  13  12  8 0 5 0 4  80 
Rwanda  (2006)  21  7 2 7 4 9 1 7 0 1  59 













Total  455  134 68 239  155  158 51 246 81 110  1,697 
   Total  1,019  253 193 565 385 291 105 621 100 239  3,771 L. Fox and A.M. Oviedo    Institutions and Labor Market Outcomes in Africa 



















Anglophone 25  9  11  13  33  49.2 
Francophone 25  3  19  24  29  66.9 
Source: Enterprise Surveys 
 
Table 9: Unionized workforce 









Botswana (2006)  18.1  11.7  5.0 
Gambia  (2006)  17.6 9.1 17.0 
Ghana2007  50.4 24.4 42.0 
Kenya  (2003)  63.6 44.1 25.0 
Namibia  (2006)  50.5 36.2 29.0 
Swaziland (2006) 37.2 21.8 33.0 
Tanzania  (2003)  51.6 40.1 38.0 
Tanzania  (2006)  46.7 34.8 34.0 
Uganda (2003)  10.1  6.5  5.0 
Uganda  (2006)  8.3 2.6 4.0 
Male        22.0 












Total  42.8 24.1 23.0 
Benin  (2004)  6.5 3.6 4.0 
Burkina Faso (2006)  35.3  27.2  16.0 
Burundi (2006)  1.3 1.3 3.0 
Cameroon (2006)  31.1 17.9 34.0 
Cape Verde (2006)  46.8 31.2 30.0 
DR  Congo  (2006)  23.9 15.1 30.0 
Guinea (2006)  8.8  3.8  15.0 
Madagascar (2005)  27.5 10.0 11.0 
Mali  (2003)  43.7 29.6 29.0 
Mauritania (2006)  42.8 27.8 24.0 
Rwanda  (2006)  12.0 8.8 10.0 
Senegal  (2003)  46.5 30.3 27.0 
Male        19.0 













Total  24.5 14.8 18.0 
*: A firm is unionized if it has any number of unionized workers. Over half of the firms have no 
unionized workers at all. 
§: In the workers' sample. 
Source: Enterprise Surveys       L. Fox and A.M. Oviedo    Institutions and Labor Market Outcomes in Africa 
 
Table 10: Unionization rate by firm age (percentage) 
 Anglophone  Francophone 
Less than 5 years old  10.5  6.7 
5 to 9 years old  22.3  8.5 
10 to 19 years old  21.6  17.1 
20 to 39 years old  31.6  25.2 
40 years old and older  44.4  36.2 
Total 24.0  14.8 
Source: Enterprise Surveys     
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Table 11: Potential employment in the absence of legal restrictions 





















(% of current 
employment) 
Botswana (2006)  3.2  6.9  35.3  -0.8 
Gambia (2006)  0.5  6.4  7.2  -0.0 
Ghana2007        
Kenya (2003)  101.0  33.2 239.0  -32.5 
Namibia (2006)  0.9  3.9  8.5  -0.6 
Swaziland (2006)  19.3 5.8  328.3  -0.4 
Tanzania (2003)  10.3  24.9  29.0  -4.1 
Tanzania (2006)  0.6  0.4  10.8  -0.5 
Uganda (2003)  51.1 28.3  105.3  -29.7 












Total 10.3  6.1  119.2  -3.2 
Benin (2004)  30.0  41.7  62.6  -6.8 
Burkina Faso (2006) 2.6  3.9 57.3 -0.4
Burundi (2006) 2.0 3.0 55.7 -0.3
Cameroon (2006) 0.8  5.0 6.9 -0.5
Cape Verde (2006) 1.2  4.3 28.7 -0.0
DR Congo (2006) 1.2  4.3 25.5 -0.1
Guinea (2006) 0.4  0.7 10.0 -0.3
Madagascar (2005) 14.8  21.0 37.7 -8.7
Mali (2003) 41.4  26.8 80.9 -26.9
Mauritania (2006) 3.0  8.9 32.6 -0.1
Rwanda (2006) 0.1 0.0 -0.1













Total 13.4  12.8 63.1 -6.1
Note: These numbers are calculated on the basis of the response to the following question: "in the absence of 
restrictions to hiring and firing workers, how many workers would you currently employ? (Answer expressed as a 
percentage of current employment)" The first column is the absolute value of the response minus 100. The second 
column counts the number of firms that would increase employment in the absence of restrictions. The third column 
is the average increase in employment only for firms that would like to expand. The last column is the average 












DB overall  DB labor 
DB overall  1.00    
DB labor  0.57*  1.00 
Labor regulations obstacle (perception)  -0.11  0.26 
Employment growth  -0.04  -0.17 
Firms with positive  
employment growth (%)  0.03 -0.15 
Average difference between  
potential and actual employment   -0.20  -0.17 
For potentially contracting: average 
reduction in employment potential   -0.06 -0.13 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level or better. Correlations between 
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Table 13: Determinants of employment growth 
      Dependent variable: 
    Annual employment growth  Long run employment growth 
Small [6-10]  -0.102***  -0.102*** -3.919***  -4.537*** 
  [3.93] [3.92] [4.96]  [5.61] 
Small-medium [11-20]  -0.102*** -0.101*** -4.334***  -5.640*** 
  [3.59] [3.57] [4.98]  [5.47] 
Medium [21-50]  -0.110***  -0.112*** -5.735***  -8.150*** 
  [4.23] [4.15] [6.66]  [6.92] 
Medium-large [51-100]  -0.126*** -0.137*** -6.984*** -10.451*** 
  [4.39] [4.46] [6.13]  [6.57] 














    [4.78] [4.82] [7.63]  [7.41] 
[5-9] years old  -0.101**  -0.098**  1.813***  1.126* 
  [2.33] [2.49] [2.73]  [1.96] 
[10-19] years old  -0.144***  -0.141***  1.733***  0.974** 
  [3.21] [3.41] [3.91]  [2.45] 
[20-39] years old  -0.231***  -0.230***  2.975***  2.085*** 
  [5.36] [5.68] [4.36]  [3.51] 










  [5.88] [6.14] [2.36]  [1.32] 
   Civil-law system  -0.09 0.02  -2.535***  -1.220** 
    (Franco/Lusophone)  [1.04] [0.48] [4.66]  [2.09] 
Exporter     0.053*    3.722*** 
   [1.75]    [4.27] 
Has access to credit    0.017    1.603** 
   [0.59]    [2.35] 
Uses e-mail for business    0.041*    1.936*** 
   [1.94]    [4.44] 
Owns a generator    0.046**    2.998*** 
   [2.21]    [6.78] 
Sole  proprietorship   0.131***   -1.426*** 
   [4.83]    [4.56] 




























      [1.21]     [3.35] 
 Constant  0.487***  0.259*** 6.667***  4.051*** 
    [5.10] [5.02] [6.36]  [5.15] 
    Observations  3043 2931 3428  3286 
    R-squared  0.06 0.08 0.09  0.14 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Annual 
employment growth is calculated as the annualized growth rate of employment between last fiscal year and 3 fiscal 
years back. Long term growth is the growth rate between initial employment and employment in the last fiscal year. 
Countries are weighted by their GDP. Country and industry dummies included in all regressions. Omitted categories 
are micro (less than 5 employees) and very young firms (less than 5 years old). 
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Small [6-10] -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -4.408*** -4.452*** -4.418***
[4.09] [4.12] [4.07] [5.89] [5.97] [5.94]
Small-medium [11-20] -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.102*** -5.611*** -5.642*** -5.600***
[3.49] [3.58] [3.52] [5.88] [5.86] [5.84]
Medium [21-50] -0.112*** -0.115*** -0.114*** -8.055*** -8.074*** -8.024***
[4.16] [4.28] [4.24] [7.63] [7.50] [7.49]
Medium-large [51-100] -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.142*** -10.395*** -10.433*** -10.370***
[4.53] [4.68] [4.61] [7.18] [7.12] [7.11]
Large [100+] -0.164*** -0.171*** -0.168*** -13.026*** -13.081*** -12.973***
[4.43] [4.61] [4.55] [8.24] [8.08] [8.06]
[5-9] years old -0.103** -0.102** -0.105*** 1.171* 1.115* 1.162*
[2.52] [2.52] [2.60] [1.96] [1.85] [1.93]
[10-19] years old -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.146*** 0.928** 1.001** 0.946**
[3.33] [3.33] [3.47] [2.31] [2.48] [2.35]
[20-39] years old -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.244*** 2.281*** 2.590*** 2.330***
[5.80] [5.82] [5.99] [3.77] [4.16] [3.85]
40 and older -0.276*** -0.271*** -0.283*** 2.102 2.484* 2.138
[6.42] [6.38] [6.56] [1.59] [1.86] [1.62]
Exporter 0.055* 0.056* 0.056* 3.842*** 3.872*** 3.821***
[1.82] [1.86] [1.86] [4.92] [4.87] [4.82]
Has access to credit 0.014 0.016 0.014 1.796*** 1.970*** 1.805***
[0.50] [0.58] [0.50] [3.06] [3.36] [3.09]
Uses e-mail for business 0.048** 0.051** 0.045** 2.051*** 2.339*** 2.083***
[2.21] [2.35] [2.04] [4.57] [5.25] [4.75]
Owns a generator 0.029 0.023 0.028 3.082*** 2.883*** 3.097***
[1.41] [1.10] [1.37] [6.30] [6.29] [6.39]
Sole proprietorship 0.148*** 0.138*** 0.139*** -2.059*** -2.005*** -1.957***
[5.39] [5.14] [5.15] [6.44] [5.64] [5.49]
Provides training to workers 0.026 0.026 0.025 1.930*** 1.977*** 1.939***
[1.38] [1.41] [1.32] [3.42] [3.52] [3.46]
GDP growth (annual) 0.006 0.006 0.007*
[1.54] [1.58] [1.80]
GDP growth (1996-2005) -0.645*** -0.559*** -0.678***
[4.04] [3.54] [3.83]
Overall DB -0.069 -0.132* -5.711*** -5.016***
[1.17] [1.83] [3.58] [3.41]
Labor DB 0.031 0.067** -2.028** -0.883
[1.17] [2.02] [2.02] [0.90]
Constant 0.295*** 0.235*** 0.310*** 11.479*** 7.940*** 11.513***
[5.08] [4.92] [5.14] [6.57] [7.68] [6.55]
Observations 2931 2931 2931 3286 3286 3286
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.13
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Annual 
employment growth is calculated as the annualized growth rate of employment between last fiscal year and 3 fiscal 
years back. Long term growth is the growth rate between initial employment and employment in the last fiscal year. 
Countries are weighted by their GDP. Industry dummies included in all regressions. Omitted categories are micro 
(less than 5 employees) and very young firms (less than 5 years old). Long term growth is the country-specific trend 


























































Table 14: Determinants of employment growth with country-specific controls
Annual employment growth Long run employment growth
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